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Abstract
The size of the rental housing market in most countries around the globe is small. In 
this article, we claim that this may be detrimental to macroeconomic stability. We 
do it in three steps. First, using survey data for Poland, a country with a high home-
ownership ratio, we discuss microeconomic housing tenure choice determinants. 
Second, with a panel of 28 EU countries over the period 2004–2017, we provide 
evidence that the response of house prices to macroeconomic fundamentals is atten-
uated by the size of the private rental market. Third, we propose a DSGE model in 
which households satisfy housing needs both by owning and by renting. By simulat-
ing the model, we show that reforms enhancing the rental housing market contribute 
to macroeconomic stability. We conclude by formulating policy recommendations.
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1 Introduction
The role of housing for the macroeconomy cannot be overstated. According to 
Leamer (2007), fluctuations in housing market activity are the core cause of the 
business cycle and the data on residential investment can be successfully used 
as an early warning sign of an oncoming recession. In context of the European 
monetary integration, the high importance of the housing market has manifested 
in the form of substantial imbalances and painful adjustment in many countries, 
especially in Spain and Ireland (Rubio 2014a). There are also numerous analy-
ses on the importance of the housing market for the transmission of macroeco-
nomic disturbances to the economy (Iacoviello 2005; Kivedal 2014). Even though 
interactions between the housing market and the real economy are extensively 
explored in the literature (see the literature review in Lee et al. 2017), the number 
of studies analyzing the role of the housing tenure structure for macroeconomic 
stability is scarce. An example of such a study is the work of Arce and Lopez-
Salido (2011), who build a theoretical model to show that the availability of 
rental housing reduces the risk of a house price bubble. Similarly, Rubio (2014b) 
finds, within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework that 
a larger rental market makes monetary policy more stabilizing. These results are 
confirmed by panel regressions of Cuerpo et al. (2014) or Czerniak and Rubaszek 
(2018), who indicate that the rental market share diminishes fluctuations in the 
housing sector.
In this context, a low share of the private rental market observed in most 
countries around the globe might be considered as a serious structural weakness 
and raises two important questions. The first one relates to the reasons behind 
this situation. The literature provides some generic answers. At a macro level, 
it has been already shown that the different homeownership rates across Euro-
pean countries can be attributed to the efficiency of institutions, fiscal policies, as 
well as cultural or educational factors (Earley 2004; Mora-Sanguinetti 2010). At 
a micro level, it has been established that households’ tenure choices are affected 
not only by economic factors, but also by the fact that ownership usually provides 
higher housing satisfaction than renting (Elsinga and Hoekstra 2005; Ben-Sha-
har 2007; Diaz-Serrano 2009). However, the literature lacks studies that are able 
to connect the micro evidence with a macroeconomic approach, in order to give 
policy recommendations that are supported with data at the microeconomic level.
In this paper, we contribute to this literature by proposing a micro–macro per-
spective on the role of the private rental market. We start by providing the micro 
evidence to explain the reasons behind housing tenure choices in Poland, a para-
digmatic case of a country in which the private rental market share (RMS) is small. 
By analyzing the answers of Poles to a survey, which was conducted by Rubaszek 
and Czerniak (2017), we show that the preferences of the respondents are strongly 
tilted toward owning, mainly because they perceive ownership as the only way to 
provide a safe place for the family and to really “feel at home.” Consequently, the 
rental market is currently treated only as a temporary solution, and not as a vital 
alternative to ownership for a longer stay. The reasons behind this choice are both 
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psychological and economic but definitely closely related to the existent regula-
tion. We continue by providing the macro evidence that a high RMS is a factor 
stabilizing house price fluctuations. We do it by constructing a database for a panel 
of 28 EU countries over the years 2004–2017 and conducting a series of regres-
sions, which show that the relationship between real house prices and the standard 
determinants (economic activity, the level of interest rates, as well as the level of 
credit to households) depends on the size of the private rental market. In the third 
step, we match the micro and macro evidence by proposing a microfounded DSGE 
model with a housing rental market, in the spirit of Ortega et al. (2011) and Rubio 
(2014b) framework, to assess the role of the housing tenure structure for macro-
economic stability. We calibrate the model to Polish data and the results of the 
survey, which allows us to identify inefficiencies in the functioning of the rental 
market. Finally, we propose a series of reforms, the effects of which are estimated 
by conducting counterfactual simulations with the DSGE model. We quantify the 
effects of (i) improving tenant protection legislation, (ii) equalizing fiscal incen-
tives for different types of housing tenures, and (iii) improving the standard of 
rental services. All three reforms lead to an increase in the share of the rental mar-
ket, which in turn contributes to higher macroeconomic stability. In particular, we 
show that rental market development diminishes the impact of shocks to the finan-
cial sector on the key macroeconomic variables.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the typical rea-
sons behind the low popularity of the housing rental market using the data from 
the survey. Section 3 describes the results of panel data regressions. Section 4 pre-
sents the DSGE model. Section 5 discusses the effects of rental market reform. The 
last section concludes and provides some interpretation of the results in the form of 
policy recommendations.
2  The survey: micro evidence
In this section, we focus on the microeconomic determinants of housing tenure 
choices in Poland, a representative country with an underdeveloped housing rental 
market. This underdevelopment is well illustrated by Eurostat data, which show that 
in 2016 the share of private market tenants amounted to merely 4.5%. This is much 
less compared to Western EU countries, in which the relevant shares amounted to 
39.8% in Germany, 19.2% in France, 18.0% in the UK, or 16.8% in Italy. At the 
same time, the size of the private rental market was comparable to other countries in 
Eastern Europe, except for the Czech Republic (Fig. 1). Our analysis is based on a 
survey among a representative group of 1005 Poles, which was conducted between 
June 9 and June 13, 2016, within a regular Omnibus CAPI survey by IPSOS. The 
exact content of the survey as well as the distribution to all answers is discussed in 
detail in Rubaszek and Czerniak (2017).1 Here, we present only the most important 
1 Given that the article of Rubaszek and Czerniak (2017) is in Polish in “Appendix,” we provide the 
translation of selected questions into English.
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results in the context of the discussion on what determines tenure choices in coun-
tries with an underdeveloped rental market, which are useful in justifying the struc-
ture and calibration of the DSGE model presented in the next sections.
We start by describing the characteristics of the rental market that emerge from 
the survey. It turns out that private market tenants are usually unmarried and young 
(up to 30 years), do not have children, and inhabit relatively small dwellings (for 
over half of respondents the surface was smaller than 45 m 2 ) that are located in large 
cities. The duration of their stay in the currently occupied house is rather short (for 
almost three quarters of respondents it is < 5 years), and they plan to change their 
address in a short-term horizon (almost half of the respondents plan to move within 
5 years). This description fits well students or people who have just started their 
professional careers, for whom renting is a temporary form of satisfying housing 
needs. The private rental market is not treated as a serious alternative to ownership 
for long-term stay. This is confirmed by the answers to the question in which the 
respondents could choose between renting and buying a house with a mortgage: 
29.7% of them selected renting against 52.6% preferring a mortgage. Our interpreta-
tion of the above results is that preferences of households are strongly tilted toward 
ownership.
To further explore the reasons behind tenure choices, we have asked a series of 
questions related to economic and psychological reasons to own or rent. The exact 
choice of the factors, which are presented in Table 1, is based on the previous studies 
on housing tenure choice determinants (Henderson and Ioannides 1983; Bourassa 
1995; Harding et al. 2000; Coolen et al. 2002; Sinai and Souleles 2005; Elsinga and 
Hoekstra 2005; Ben-Shahar 2007; Diaz-Serrano 2009). The results clearly show that 
Poles prefer owning to renting due to both psychological and economic reasons. The 
distribution of answers indicates that 64.0% of respondents think that servicing a 
mortgage is cheaper than paying a rent, whereas 12.6% are of the opposite opinion. 
Moreover, a dominant proportion of respondents (65.6%) consider the risk of rental 
Fig. 1  The share of the private rental market in EU countries in 2016. Source: Eurostat
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price changes to be higher than the risk of house price fluctuations. This means 
that, for most households, renting is considered to be financially less attractive than 
owning. Regarding the psychological factors, the distribution of answers is broadly 
similar for all of them: about 70% of respondents prefer owning and about 10% of 
them indicate renting, whereas about 20% have no opinion. The result that is worth 
emphasizing is that the respondents do not consider rented dwellings to be a good 
place for a family. In this sense, the survey clearly indicates that households derive 
greater utility from living in owned rather than rented houses.
To better understand the reluctance toward renting, we also present the 
answers to a series of questions that could help to assess which factors are the 
main hindrance to the rental market development. The upper panel of Table  2 
analyzes the barriers to demand for rental housing. It shows that among factors 
that are considered to decrease the comfort of being a tenant, the most impor-
tant ones are related to how the rental market is organized and regulated. In the 
former case, more than half of respondents agree that tenants are excessively 
constrained in arranging the interior of rented apartments and landlords are 
inspecting housing units too often. This lack of professionalism among individ-
ual landlords obviously decreases satisfaction from living in a rented apartment 
as compared to owning it. In the latter case, more than half of the respondents 
agree that inefficient regulations related to rent control and tenant protection 
decrease the comfort of renting. It should be noted that regulations protecting 
tenants against unexpected eviction and reducing the risk of rent increases are 
of crucial importance for developing the demand for long-term rental. Finally, 
the level of rents and the offer of dwellings for rental also turned out to be 
important, albeit to a lower extent than the previous factors. The lower panel 
of Table 2 analyzes the barriers to the supply of rental housing. It demonstrates 
Table 1  Economic and psychological factors influencing housing tenure preferences Source: Rubaszek 
and Czerniak (2017)
Owning No opinion Renting
Economic factors
E1. Mortgage/rental costs 64.0 23.4 12.6
E2. Risk of house price/rent fluctuations 65.6 22.8 11.6
E3. Transaction costs 62.1 26.1 11.8
E4. Taxes 61.0 25.3 13.7
Psychological factors
P1. Social status 70.8 19.5 9.7
P2. Freedom and independence 71.1 16.5 12.3
P3. Comfort 71.6 17.0 11.3
P4. Peace of mind 70.9 17.8 11.2
P5. Well-being 71.5 17.9 10.5
P6. Attachment to dwelling 70.1 18.5 11.3
P7. Family 72.6 18.0 9.4
P8. Happiness 68.8 21.1 10.1
 M. Rubaszek, M. Rubio 
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that the main factor decreasing the attractiveness of investment in houses to let 
is related to the low culture of tenants, which should be understood twofold. 
First, tenants usually care less about the housing unit than homeowners, which 
increases the depreciation rate and thereby the level of rents. Second, there is 
a non-negligible risk that a tenant stops paying a rent and other bills or might 
even devastate the housing unit. This, combined with a high protection of ten-
ants against eviction, causes the risk of investing in rental housing in Poland to 
be high, which leads to a lower supply of rental housing.
To sum up, the results of the micro evidence are that households strongly pre-
fer owning to renting due to economic and psychological factors. Households do 
not consider rental housing as a “true home”; hence, it is not treated as a seri-
ous alternative to owning in the case of a long-term stay. This might be partly 
explained by inefficient regulations, as well as low professionalism of landlords, 
which decreases satisfaction from living in rented dwellings. We will use this 
information when calibrating the DSGE model and designing the reforms of the 
rental market.
3  Panel regressions: macro evidence
In this section, we provide macro evidence that the RMS affects the aggregate 
dynamics of the housing sector. To be more precise, using a panel of data for 28 
European Countries and years 2004–2017, we run a series of regressions to check 
if the reaction of real house prices to macroeconomic fundamentals depends on 
the housing tenure structure.
Table 2  The reasons of rental market underdevelopment in Poland Source: Rubaszek and Czerniak 
(2017)
Agree No opinion Don’t agree
Factors decreasing the comfort of being a tenant
Tenants are too much constrained in arranging apartment 56.8 30.2 12.9
Landlords are inspecting the apartment too often 53.3 34.4 12.2
Tenants are not well protected against rent increases 56.2 31.0 12.7
Tenants are not well protected against eviction 56.7 31.1 12.1
Rents are too high in comparison with mortgage installment 53.9 33.3 12.7
The offer of dwellings to rent is too scarce to meet preferences 46.8 35.9 17.3
Factors decreasing the attractiveness of investing in rental housing
Low culture of tenants 62.6 28.9 8.6
Excessive rent control 50.3 37.2 12.4
Excessive protection of tenants against eviction 40.3 43.6 16.1
Low rate of return 39.4 47.3 13.3
Low demand 44.0 41.6 14.4
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3.1  Specification
We regress the log dynamics of the real house prices ( Δhpit ) on three factors that 
turned out to be important in earlier studies (see e.g., Egert and Mihaljek 2007 
and references therein): 
Δyit  A change in economic activity measured by the log growth rate of real GDP,
Δrit  A change in the level of real interest rates,
ΔLit  A change in the level of credit to households in relation to GDP.
Moreover, following Cuerpo et al. (2014), as well as Czerniak and Rubaszek 
(2018), we assume that the relationship depends on the size of the private rental 
market (RMSit ) by introducing interaction variables. Finally, to account for the 
persistence in the dynamics of real house prices we add own lags to the set of 
regressors. The resulting specification of the model is:
where Xit = (Δyit,Δrit,ΔLit) , 휇i , and 휙t are country and time-specific fixed effects, 
whereas 훼 and 훽 are the parameters that are the main focus of our analysis. The for-
mer measures the strength of the relationship between real house prices and their 
macroeconomic determinants in a country with null RMS. The latter tells us to 
which extent this relationship is affected by the size of the private rental market, so 
that the short-term multiplier of Δhpit with respect to Xit is equal to 훼� + 훽� × RMS . 
If the private rental market is stabilizing real house prices, we would expect 훽 to be 
significantly different from zero and that the sign of 훽 is opposite to the sign of 훼.
3.2  The data
The parameters of the model were estimated using an unbalanced panel of the 
annual data for 28 European Union countries and years 2004–2017. All the data 
were collected from Eurostat using the eurostat package in R (Lahti et  al. 
2017). A detailed information about the series is as follows: 
Δhpit  The dynamics of real house prices is calculated as the log growth rate 
of a house price index (HPI), deflated by the private final consumption 
expenditure deflator. The HPI is a broad index as it describes prices of all 
residential properties purchased by households (flats, detached houses, ter-
raced houses, etc.), both new and existing, independently of their final use 
and their previous owners. The series are taken from the Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicators database (ticker tipsho20). It 
should be added that the panel of data for Δhpit is unbalanced. The miss-
ing data are: Estonia (2004–2005), Hungary (2004–2007), Poland (2004–
2008), Romania (2004–2008), and the Slovak Rep. (2004–2006).
(1)Δhpit = 휇i + 휙t + 휌1Δhpi,t−1 + 훼�Xit + 훽�(Xit × RMSit) + uit,
 M. Rubaszek, M. Rubio 
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Δyit  The change in economic activity is computed as the log change in the 
GDP chain-linked volumes index, which is normalized to 100 for the year 
2010. The series are taken from the national accounts statistics (ticker 
nama_10_gdp).
Δrit  The dynamics of interest rates is calculated as a difference in the level of 
long-term interest rates used as a convergence criterion from the Maas-
tricht Treaty (ticker irt_lt_mcby_a), which was deflated by the private 
final consumption expenditure deflator (ticker nama_10_gdp). The series 
describes the yields of government bonds denominated in national curren-
cies, traded on the secondary market, with a residual maturity of around 10 
years. The missing data for Estonia were replaced by the series for Finland.
ΔLit  The dynamics of credit to the household sector is calculated as an increase 
in the consolidated value of loans held by households at the end of the year, 
which is taken from the MIP scoreboard statistics (ticker tipsdp26), 
divided by the value of nominal GDP (ticker nama_10_gdp). The miss-
ing values of outstanding loans for Belgium (2003–2011), Ireland (2003–
2011), the Netherlands (2003–2011), and Portugal (2003–2011) were filled 
in using data taken from central banks Web pages.
RMSit  The tenure structure is taken from EU-SILC survey (ticker ilc_lvho02), 
and in rare cases of missing data they were interpolated with the na.fill 
function in R. The interpolation is justified as changes in the tenure struc-
ture are usually highly gradual.
3.3  Results
The results of panel regressions, which were obtained using the fixed effect estima-
tor, are displayed in Table  3. Columns (i)–(v) present five versions of model (1), 
which differ on the subset of zero restrictions imposed on its parameters. In speci-
fication (i), we omit the interaction variables. In specifications from (ii) to (iv), we 
focus on single determinants of house prices, whereas in specification (v) is the 
unconstrained version of the model. After a series of tests, which were inspired by 
the comments of an anonymous referee, we have decided to not include country spe-
cific, but time fixed effects. This choice is supported, among others, by the results 
of significance tests for individual and time effects as well as model fit statistics. 
Moreover, the results presented in Table  3 show that this choice eliminates any 
cross-sectional dependence of residuals as well as alleviates the problem of serial 
correlation. Finally, the Hausman test confirms that using fixed rather than random 
effects estimator is justified. In the second stage, we estimate the unconstrained 
model with various assumptions related to the inclusion of country and time-specific 
fixed effects.
The estimates of model (i) confirm the results from the previous studies, in which 
the dynamics of house prices is to a large extent driven by changes in the economic 
activity and interest rates (e.g., Egert and Mihaljek 2007). The dynamics of loans 
to the household sector turned out to be less important, even though the sign and 
magnitude of the estimated parameter are acceptable. In specifications (ii)–(iv), we 
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Table 3  Panel regression results
The values in the parentheses are standard errors clustered on countries. The asterisks ∗ , ∗∗,   and 
∗∗∗  denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. The autocorrelation is analyzed with the 
Breusch–Godfrey test of order 1 (AR test). The cross-sectional dependence (CSD) of residuals is ana-
lyzed with the test by Pesaran (2004). All calculations were done with the plm package in R (Croissant 
and Millo, 2008)
Dependent variable: Δhp
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Δhp−1  0.369∗∗∗  0.339∗∗∗  0.530∗∗∗  0.406∗∗∗  0.400∗∗∗  0.371∗∗∗  0.331∗∗∗  0.343∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.051) (0.053) (0.069) (0.050) (0.044) (0.045) (0.053)
Δy  0.884∗∗∗  1.706∗∗∗  1.108∗∗∗  1.317∗∗∗  1.438∗∗∗  1.224∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.156) (0.171) (0.171) (0.173) (0.178)
Δr − 1.098∗∗∗ − 2.307∗∗∗ − 1.496∗∗∗ − 1.391∗∗∗ − 1.237∗∗∗ − 1.354∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.263) (0.266) (0.270) (0.263) (0.259)
ΔL  0.174∗∗  0.497∗∗∗  0.114  0.202  0.349∗∗  0.281∗∗
(0.079) (0.169) (0.128) (0.134) (0.152) (0.143)
Δy × RMS − 0.057∗∗∗ − 0.029∗∗∗ − 0.023∗∗ − 0.025∗∗∗ − 0.030∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Δr × RMS  0.096∗∗∗  0.062∗∗∗  0.060∗∗∗  0.057∗∗∗  0.058∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
ΔL × RMS − 0.018∗∗  0.001  0.001 − 0.008 − 0.011
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
RMS∕100  0.026  0.138∗∗∗  0.027  0.039  0.093∗∗∗  0.094∗∗∗  0.210  0.258∗
(0.023) (0.028) (0.025) (0.037) (0.031) (0.030) (0.134) (0.140)
Ind. 
effects
No No No No No No Yes Yes
Time 
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Number 
of obs.
370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370
R2 0.713 0.699 0.691 0.565 0.744 0.708 0.730 0.760
Ind. 
effects, 
stat
0.697 1.048 0.401 0.842 0.810
Prob 0.870 0.403 0.997 0.695 0.738
Time 
effects, 
stat
3.027 3.796 9.415 12.99 3.719
Prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR, stat 3.473 5.006 0.221 12.02 1.323 2.794 0.200 0.484
Prob 0.062 0.025 0.638 0.000 0.250 0.095 0.655 0.486
CSD, stat − 1.546 − 1.593 − 1.369  0.779 − 1.784  4.710  4.177 − 1.894
Prob  0.122  0.111  0.171  0.436  0.074  0.000  0.000  0.058
Hausman, 
stat:
26.79 14.30 4.46 48.80 38.37 19.92 0.1063
Prob 0.000 0.006 0.347 0.000 0.000 0.011 1.000
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analyze the relationship between house prices and the three macroeconomic fun-
damentals, separately, accounting for the role of the RMS . Column (ii) shows that 
the elasticity of real house prices with respect to GDP is decreasing with the size of 
the private rental market: the estimate of the parameter standing at the interaction 
variable indicates that an increase in the RMS by 10% points lowers the elasticity 
by 0.57. This result would indicate that in countries with the largest RMS, standing 
over 35% (Germany and Denmark, Fig. 1), the reaction of house prices to changes in 
GDP is almost negligible. In turn, column (iii) provides evidence that the relation-
ship between house prices and real interest rates is significant, of expected sign and 
depends on the RMS. In this case, the relationship becomes negligible for the RMS 
amounting to about 25%. Regarding specification (iv), once again the private rental 
market is attenuating the relationship between house prices and the macroeconomic 
fundamental, this time the dynamics of credit to households.
A comparison of model fit, i.e., R2 statistic, for the three models with single deter-
minants indicate that GDP and interest rates are much more correlated with house 
prices that the dynamics of loans. It should be emphasized, however, that variable 
ΔL is only a rough proxy for the tightness of financing conditions. It is calculated as 
a change in the outstanding stock of loans and, hence, depends not only on the value 
of newly granted loans but also any factors that lead to valuation effects, exchange 
rate movements for instance.
In specifications (v)–(viii), we analyze the model with all three fundamentals 
together with their interaction variables. It turns out that the size of the rental mar-
ket is significantly decreasing the effect of business cycle fluctuations in economic 
activity and interest rates on the dynamics of real house prices. Moreover, it can be 
stated that this result does not depend on the inclusion of individual or time fixed 
effects. On the contrary, the parameters describing the impact of credit dynamics are 
not always significant, which confirms the results in columns (ii)–(iv).
To sum up, the results of panel regressions indicate that the private rental market 
is stabilizing the economy. The reaction of real house prices to the three macroeco-
nomic fundamentals is much stronger in countries with an underdeveloped rental 
market than in countries in which renting represents a viable alternative to home-
ownership. Below, we explain this feature of the housing market within a micro-
founded DSGE model.
4  DSGE model: matching the micro and macro evidence
In the previous sections, we have described the main factors that are a hindrance to 
rental market development as well as the aggregate effects of rental market underde-
velopment. In this section, we propose a theoretical macroeconomic framework that 
can be used to assess the effects of changes in the organization of the housing rental 
market. The result from the previous section will be crucial to the development and 
implementation of the macro model. To be more precise, we use the micro results 
to feed the macro model and assess the effects of the following reforms in housing 
markets on the macroeconomy:
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 (i) Decreasing the impact of “bad tenant” risk on the level of rents,
 (ii) Removing fiscal incentives to own,
 (iii) Increasing the professionalism of landlords, for example by means of regula-
tions on house inspections and maintenance, which would lower the psycho-
logical disadvantages of renting.
The choice of these reforms is made in light of the factors that appear to be most rel-
evant in the survey. Therefore, this part of the paper comes as a natural consequence 
of the results found in Sect. 2.
The proposed DSGE model is based on the framework of Iacoviello (2005), in the 
sense that it includes housing and a collateral constraint for borrowers, whereas the 
description of the rental market is closely related to the recent works by Ortega et al. 
(2011) and Rubio (2014b). We use the latter two models, in which the rental market 
is well characterized for our purpose. However, we had to adapt them to study spe-
cifically the Polish market. In particular, we use a two-sector housing model with a 
rental market, as in Ortega et al. (2011). However, since that model is designed for 
Spain, it is a small open economy inside a monetary union. We, instead, propose a 
monetary policy framework in which the central bank is able to set interest rates, as 
in Rubio (2014b). The main structure of the model is as follows:
1. There are two types of consumers, savers and borrowers, with different discount 
factors.
2. Savers are the landlords and provide rental services to borrowers.
3. Borrowers face collateral constraints when applying for a mortgage.
4. There are two production sectors, construction and consumption goods.
5. Housing can be purchased or rented.
6. There are fiscal incentives to purchase or rent a dwelling.
A more elaborated description, with optimization problems, is presented below.
4.1  Savers
Savers maximize their utility from consumption Cs,t , housing services Hs,t , and 
working hours Ns,t:
where 훽s ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and E0 the expectation operator. 1∕𝜂 > 0 is 
the labor-supply elasticity and j > 0 constitutes the relative weight of housing in the 
utility function. Ns,t is a composite of labor supplied to the consumption Ncs,t and 
housing sector Nhs,t,
(2)maxE0
∞∑
t=0
훽 t
s
(
logCs,t + j logHs,t −
(
Ns,t
)1+휂
1 + 휂
)
,
(3)Ns,t =
[
휔
1∕휀l
l
(
Ncs,t
)(1+휀l)∕휀l + (1 − 휔l)1∕휀l(Nhs,t)(1+휀l)∕휀l]휀l∕(1+휀l),
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where 휔l is a weight parameter and 휀l the elasticity of substitution between both 
labor types.
The budget constraint is:
where qh,t is the real housing price and wcs,t ( whs,t ) denotes real wages in the con-
sumption (housing) sector. Savers can purchase or sell houses, either to live in Hs,t or 
to rent it Hz,t at price qz,t . 훿h and 훿z are the depreciation rates for owner-occupied and 
rented dwellings, respectively. They might differ if tenants utilize the dwelling more 
intensively than owners, which is discussed in Sect.  2. We call this phenomenon 
“bad tenant” risk. We also allow for the existence of tax incentives to own, in par-
ticular a subsidy 휏h . Next, the level of savings is given by bs,t and the risk-free inter-
est rate by Rt−1 . 휋t is the inflation rate at period t. Finally, St are the profits of firms 
and Tt a lump-sum government transfer.
The first-order conditions for this optimization problem are as follows:
Equation (6) is the standard Euler equation for consumption. Equations (7) and (8) 
represent the intertemporal conditions for housing purchased to own and let, respec-
tively. In these equations, the benefits of purchasing a housing unit equate the alter-
native costs of forgone consumption. Finally, Eqs. (8) and (9) describe the labor-
supply conditions for the consumption goods and the housing sectors.
(4)
Cs,t + bs,t + qh,t
[(
1 − 휏h
)(
Hs,t −
(
1 − 훿h
)
Hs,t−1
)
+
(
Hz,t −
(
1 − 훿z
)
Hz,t−1
)]
≤
Rt−1bs,t−1
휋t
+ wcs,tNcs,t + whs,tNhs,t + qz,tHz,t + St − Tt,
(5)1
Cs,t
= 훽sEt
(
Rt
Cs,t+1휋t+1
)
,
(6)
j
Hs,t
=
(
1 − 휏h
)[ qh,t
Cs,t
− 훽s
(
1 − 훿h
)
Et
(
qh,t+1
Cs,t+1
)]
,
(7)
qh,t
Cs,t
=
qz,t
Cs,t
+ 훽s
(
1 − 훿z
)
Et
qh,t+1
Cs,t+1
,
(8)
wcs,t
Cs,t
=
(
Ns,t
)휂
휔
1∕휀l
l
(
Ncs,t
Ns,t
)1∕휀l
,
(9)
whs,t
Cs,t
=
(
Ns,t
)휂(
1 − 휔l
)1∕휀l(Nhs,t
Ns,t
)1∕휀l
.
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4.2  Borrowers
Borrowers solve a similar optimization problem as savers:
where 𝛽b < 𝛽s is the discount factor for borrowers, and
The key difference in the optimization problems of savers and borrowers is that H̃b,t 
is a composite of owned housing purchased with a mortgage Hb,t and rental services 
Hz,t:
The parameter 휔h is very important in our analysis, as it approximates the prefer-
ence for owning a house (purchased on credit) versus the rental housing. In turn, 휀h 
describes the elasticity of substitution between preferences for owner-occupied and 
rental housing. In this way, borrowers derive utility from the two types of housing. 
It should be emphasized that this does not literally mean that each borrower lives 
simultaneously in their own house and in a rented house. Instead, the interpretation 
is that there exists a large representative borrower-type household with a continuum 
of members, some of whom live in owner-occupied houses, the rest of whom live in 
rented houses. This composite index in the equation thus represents the aggregate 
preferences of all household members with respect to each kind of housing service.
For borrowers, we also allow for tax incentives to rent, in particular a subsidy to rent 
휏z is considered. Thus, the budget constraint and the collateral constraint for the bor-
rowers are as follows:
where bb,t represents the level of debt and kt is a maximum loan-to-value ratio (LTV) 
that follows an autoregressive process log kt = (1 − 휌k) log(k) + 휌k log kt−1 + 휁t with 
normally distributed shocks, where k is a steady-state value of the LTV. A shock to 
the LTV represents a credit constraint loosening or tightening.
The first-order conditions of this maximization problem are:
(10)maxE0
∞∑
t=0
훽 t
b
(
logCb,t + j log H̃b,t −
(
Nb,t
)1+휂
1 + 휂
)
,
(11)Nb,t =
[
휔
1∕휀l
l
(
Ncb,t
)(1+휀l)∕휀l + (1 − 휔l)1∕휀l(Nhb,t)(1+휀l)∕휀l]휀l∕(1+휀l).
(12)H̃b,t =
[
𝜔
1∕𝜀h
h
(
Hb,t
)(𝜀h−1)∕𝜀h + (1 − 𝜔h)1∕𝜀h(Hz,t)(𝜀h−1)∕𝜀h]𝜀h∕(𝜀h−1).
(13)
Cb,t +
Rt−1bb,t−1
휋t
+ qh,t
(
1 − 휏h
)(
Hb,t −
(
1 − 훿h
)
Hb,t−1
)
+ qz,t
(
1 − 휏z
)
Hz,t
≤ bb,t + wcb,tNcb,t + whb,tNhb,t,
(14)bb,t ≤ Et
(
1
Rt
ktqh,t+1Hb,t휋t+1
)
,
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where 휆t is the Lagrange multiplier of the collateral constraint. The above condi-
tions can be interpreted analogously to those for savers. The most important differ-
ence is in the demand equation for owned and rented housing (17 and 18), which 
now equates the marginal utility from housing services (and the marginal value 
of housing as collateral in the case of Eq. 17) with the alternative cost of forgone 
consumption.
4.3  Firms
The intermediate consumption goods market is monopolistically competitive. The 
individual firm production function is:
where the only factor of production is labor supplied by each agent, with 훾 ∈ [0, 1] 
measuring the relative size of each group in terms of labor. At represents technology, 
which is an autoregressive process logAt = 휌A logAt−1 + ut with normally distrib-
uted shocks. The symmetry across firms allows for avoiding the index z and rewrit-
ing the above equation in the form of the aggregate production function for con-
sumption goods:
(15)1
Cb,t
= 훽bEt
(
Rt
Cb,t+1휋t+1
)
+ 휆tRt,
(16)
j
H̃b,t
(
𝜔hH̃b,t
Hb,t
)1∕𝜀h
=
(
1 − 𝜏h
)( qh,t
Cb,t
− 𝛽b
(
1 − 𝛿h
)
Et
qh,t+1
Cb,t+1
)
− 𝜆tktEtqh,t+1𝜋t+1,
(17)j
H̃b,t
((
1 − 𝜔h
)
H̃b,t
Hz,t
)1∕𝜀h
=
(
1 − 𝜏z
) qz,t
Cb,t
,
(18)
wcb,t
Cb,t
=
(
Nb,t
)휂
휔
1∕휀l
l
(
Ncb,t
Nb,t
)1∕휀l
,
(19)
whb,t
Cb,t
=
(
Nb,t
)휂(
1 − 휔l
)1∕휀l(Nhb,t
Nb,t
)1∕휀l
,
(20)Yt(z) = At
(
Ncs,t(z)
)훾(
Ncb,t(z)
)(1−훾)
,
(21)Yt = AtN훾cs,tN
(1−훾)
cb,t
.
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The intermediate housing investment goods market is subject to the same technol-
ogy shock At . Both types of households also supply labor to the construction sector, 
with the same relative size as in the consumption sector. The aggregate production 
function for housing investment is therefore:
Intermediate goods producers maximize profits:
where Xt is the markup that is equal to the inverse of real marginal costs.2 The first-
order conditions are the following:
These first-order conditions represent the labor demanded for each type of consumer 
by each sector, respectively. The price setting problem for the intermediate goods 
producers is a standard Calvo–Yun case. They sell goods at price Pt(z) . They can 
re-optimize the price with 1 − 휃 probability in each period. The optimal reset price 
POPT
t
(z) solves:
where 휀p represents the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods.
The aggregate price level is therefore:
(22)IHt = AtN훾hs,tN
(1−훾)
hb,t
.
(23)max
Ncs,t ,Nhs,t ,Ncb,t ,Nhb,t
Yt
Xt
+ qh,tIHt − wcs,tNcs,t − whs,tNhs,t − wcb,tNcb,t − whb,tNhb,t,
(24)wcs,t =
1
Xt
훾
Yt
Ncs,t
,
(25)wcb,t =
1
Xt
(1 − 훾)
Yt
Ncb,t
,
(26)whs,t =훾
qh,tIHt
Nhs,t
,
(27)whb,t =(1 − 훾)
qh,tIHt
Nhb,t
.
(28)
∞∑
k=0
(휃훽)kEt
{
Λt,k
[
POPT
t
(z)
Pt+k
−
휀p∕
(
휀p − 1
)
Xt+k
]
YOPT
t+k
(z)
}
= 0,
(29)Pt =
[
휃P
1−휀p
t−1
+ (1 − 휃)
(
POPT
t
)1−휀p]1∕(1−휀p).
2 The intermediate goods firms operate under monopolistically competitive conditions, and this is why 
there is a markup X
t
. Therefore, they can make positive profits that are rebated back to savers (variable S
t
 
in equation 4).
 M. Rubaszek, M. Rubio 
1 3
By combining (28) with (29) and log-linearizing, we can obtain the standard for-
ward-looking Phillips curve.
4.4  Monetary authority and equilibrium conditions
To close the model, we assume that the central bank sets interest rates according to a 
Taylor rule that responds to inflation and output growth:3
where 0 ≤ 휌 ≤ 1 is the parameter associated with interest rate smoothing. 𝜙𝜋 > 0 
and 𝜙y > 0 measure the interest rate response to inflation and output growth, respec-
tively. R is the steady-state value of the interest rate. 휀R,t is a white noise shock with 
0 mean and 휎2
휀
 variance.
The equilibrium conditions for the consumption goods and housing investment 
markets are:
Finally, the equilibrium government budget constraint is:
5  Reforming the rental market
5.1  Calibrating the model
We calibrate the model to the characteristics of the Polish economy, including 
the data that we collected in the survey. The weight parameter in the CES basket 
of housing services 휔h is set at 2 / 3, based on answers to the question asking the 
preferred tenure choice in the case of no funds to buy a dwelling (taking mortgage 
vs. renting). The parameters describing the labor market were fixed at 휔l = 0.14 
and j = 0.06 so that the share of labor in the construction sector stood at 7.6%. 
The value of j parameter, together with quarterly depreciation rates at 훿z = 1% and 
훿h = 0.75% , additionally fixes the residential investment to GDP ratio at 3.3%, 
close to the 2007–2015 average from the OECD data. The discount factor 훽s was 
(30)Rt =
(
Rt−1
)휌[
휋
(1+휙휋)
t
(
Yt
Yt−1
)휙y
R
](1−휌)
휀R,t,
(31)Yt =Cs,t + Cb,t,
(32)
IHt ≡
(
Hs,t −
(
1 − 훿h
)
Hs,t−1
)
+
(
Hb,t −
(
1 − 훿h
)
Hb,t−1
)
+
(
Hz,t −
(
1 − 훿z
)
Hz,t−1
)
.
(33)Tt = 휏zqz,tHz,t + 휏hqh,t
[(
Hs,t −
(
1 − 훿h
)
Hs,t−1
)
+
(
Hb,t −
(
1 − 훿h
)
Hb,t−1
)]
.
3 In terms of the dynamics of the model, there is not much difference between using output growth or 
output gaps in the Taylor rule. However, especially when taking the model to the data, output growth is 
much easier to observe than output gap. This is why we have made this choice.
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set to 0.995 so that, taking into account the value of 훿z , the ratio of quarterly rents 
qz was equal to 1.5% of house value, in line with the National Bank of Poland 
data presented in quarterly reports “Information on home prices and the situation 
in the housing and commercial real estate market in Poland.” Regarding param-
eters describing regulations, we set the steady-state LTV value k to 0.8, in line 
with the current restrictions related to the maximum LTV, and took into account 
that landlords have to pay 8.5% turnover taxes ( 휏z = −0.085 ). Finally, given all 
the above parameters, we set the share of savers to be 훾 = 2∕3 , so that the share 
of the rental market stood at 6.8%, in line with the survey data (excluding public 
rental). The above choice implies that the share of owners with a mortgage is 
17.2%, a little bit more than in the survey (10.4% if we exclude public rental). 
This share is higher than what is observed in the data as the mortgage markets in 
Poland were almost nonexistent before 2004; hence, it is difficult to claim that the 
current share is the steady-state value.
The remaining parameters are set to values commonly used in the literature. For 
borrowers, we use a slightly lower discount factor than the one for savers. Following 
Horvath (2000), we set the elasticity of substitution between labor types to 휀l = 1 . 
For the elasticity of substitution between services from home ownership and renting, 
we follow Ortega et al. (2011) and take the value 휀h = 2 in order to make house-
holds more sensitive to the relative price of buying a house and renting it than would 
be the case under lower values. The value for the elasticity of substitution among 
intermediate goods, 휀p = 6 , implies a markup of 20% in the steady state, a value 
Table 4  Calibration of the DSGE model
Parameter Value Description
훽s 0.995 Discount factor of savers
훽b 0.985 Discount factor of borrowers
j 0.06 Relative weight on utility from housing services
휔l 0.14 Weight parameter in labor services aggregator
휔h 2/3 Weight parameter in housing services aggregator
휀l 1 Elasticity of substitution between labor types
휀h 2 Elasticity of subst btw. home ownership and rent
휂 1 Inverse elasticity of labor supply
휀p 6 Elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods
훾 2/3 Savers labor-income share
훿h 0.75% Depreciation rate of the housing stock
훿z 1.00% Depreciation rate of the rental stock
k 0.8 Maximum LTV ratio (steady state)
휃 0.75 Calvo parameter
휏h 0 Subsidy rate house purchases for owner occupation
휏z − 0.085 Subsidy rate on rent payments (here taxes)
휌 0.9 Coefficient on lagged nominal interest rate in Taylor rule
휙Π 0.5 Coefficient on inflation in the Taylor rule
휙Y 0.5 Coefficient on output in the Taylor rule
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commonly found in the literature. The probability of not changing prices is chosen 
to be 휃 = 0.75 , implying that prices change every four quarters on average. The coef-
ficients in the Taylor rule are set to 휌 = 0.9 for the lagged interest rate and 휙휋 = 0.5 
for inflation and 휙y = 0.5 output, respectively, as proposed in the seminal paper by 
Taylor. The values for the above parameters are reported in Table  4. The result-
ing model steady-state ratios, compared to their data counterparts, are presented in 
Table  5. It shows that the model reproduces the average proportion of residential 
investment over GDP, 3.4% (3.3% in the data), as well as the weight of employment 
in construction over total employment (7.7% in the model, 7.6% in the data). The 
rental share in the model is 6.9% (consistent with the 6.8 %, found in the survey), 
whereas the share of housing with mortgages is 17.2% in the model, which is above 
the number found in the data (10.4%) due to the reasons discussed above.
5.2  Steady‑state analysis
We can now use the DSGE model described previously to evaluate the effects of 
residential rental market reforms on the main macroeconomic variables. In particu-
lar, based on the micro evidence, we focus on the quantitative effects of:
 (i) Removing fiscal disincentives to rent (neutral taxes),
 (ii) Improving regulations behind the rental contract (lower “bad tenant” risk),
 (iii) Lowering the disutility of renting (professional rental services).
In terms of the model, this would correspond to setting taxes on rental income ( 휏z ) 
equal to zero, diminishing the depreciation rate of rental housing ( 훿z ), and lowering 
the preference parameter of owner-occupied housing ( 휔h ), respectively. It should be 
noted that the time horizon of the above three reforms is different. As reforms (i) 
and (ii) can be introduced relatively quickly, reform (iii) should be considered as 
a long-lasting process, requiring an increase in the quality of rental services and a 
gradual shift in attitudes.
Here, we display the consequences of these reforms on steady-state values, to 
capture the long-run or structural effects of these measures. The results for the key 
variables and ratios are displayed in Table 6. Specifically, in the second column of 
Table 5  Steady-state ratios
Data Model Data sources
Housing rental Share, Hz∕H 0.069 0.068 Survey data
Share of housing w/ mortgage, Hb∕H 0.104 0.172 Survey data
Rent over housing price, qz∕qh 0.015 0.015 National Bank 
of Poland, 
2007–2015
Residential investment / GDP, qhIH∕GDP 0.033 0.034 OECD, 2007–2015
Construction labor share, Lh∕(Lc + Lh) 0.076 0.077 OECD, 2007–2015
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the table we present the results for a fiscal policy reform, the third column displays 
the steady-state values associated with lower “bad tenant” risk, and the fourth col-
umn presents the long-run effects of lowering the disutility of renting. The fifth col-
umn presents the combined effects of the above three reforms.
We can observe that the first reform, moving to a neutral fiscal policy with no 
subsidies on housing markets, has relatively small effects on overall economic activ-
ity, although it contributes to increasing the housing rental share. This measure 
implies a reallocation of the available housing stock from the ownership to the rental 
segment of the market. In particular, the rental share in the housing market increases 
to 7.7%. On the contrary, borrowers reduce their holdings of mortgaged houses, 
so that the share of mortgaged houses in the total housing stock falls from 60.9 to 
59.4% of GDP. The effects of the second reform are quite similar, in the sense that 
the overall economic activity is not affected much and the largest effect is the real-
location of the housing stock from the ownership to the rental segment, which trans-
lates into changes in mortgage debt. Finally, an increase in the household prefer-
ence for renting also has similar effects to the other two measures. It increases the 
size of the rental market and lowers the amount of houses that are purchased with 
a mortgage. This measure brings the strongest effects, although it is more difficult 
to implement in the short run because it implies changing preferences or cultural 
factors. The last column displays the combined effects of all three reforms together. 
Since they all have effects that go almost in the same direction, we see that the hous-
ing rental share increases sizably from a value of 6.8 to 15%, whereas the value of 
mortgage debt decreases by one-third, from 60.9 to 40.9% of GDP. This suggests 
that there should be an effort toward implementing a combination of these measures 
in order to obtain stronger results.
Table 6  Steady-state effects of rental market reforms
Benchmark Neutral taxes Lower “bad tenant” 
risk
Professional 
rental ser-
vices
Combined
휏z = 0 훿z = 0.75% 휔h = 0.5
Housing rental share 0.068 0.077 0.091 0.104 0.150
Share of housing w/
mortgage
0.172 0.167 0.160 0.132 0.113
Rent over housing 
price
0.015 0.015 0.0125 0.015 0.0125
Residential investment/
GDP
0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034
Construction labor 
share
0.077 0.077 0.076 0.077 0.077
Mortgage debt/GDP 0.609 0.594 0.574 0.466 0.409
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5.3  Impulse response analysis
We have already shown that the reforms of the rental market are mainly affecting the 
steady-state values of two variables: the rental share and the level of mortgage debt 
to GDP ratio. A question that arises is whether these changes affect fluctuations of 
the economy over the business cycle, that is, if they also have short-run effects. In 
order to assess this, we compare the dynamic response of the economy before and 
after the rental market reform with three macroeconomic disturbances: productiv-
ity, monetary, and loan-to-value shocks. The shape of the impulse response func-
tions is presented in Fig. 2. The model is solved by taking a linear approximation 
of the structural equations. From the solution of the model, impulse responses can 
be calculated, that is, how variables respond to a given shock. Each row in the fig-
ure represents the variable of interest, which includes two key macrovariables, infla-
tion and GDP, as well as house prices. In the case of columns, they represent three 
macroeconomic shocks (productivity, monetary, and LTV). Finally, each panel pre-
sents the effect of a given shock (one standard deviation) on the variable of interest 
Fig. 2  Impulse responses to structural shocks
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(expressed in percentage deviations from the steady state) in two scenarios (before 
and after the full reform).
Figure 2 shows that the reform of the rental market is not changing the effect of 
a monetary and a productivity shock on the macroeconomy. This can be interpreted 
by the fact that both shocks do not have a significant impact on the relative costs of 
owning in comparison with renting. The availability of mortgages is not affected 
either because the strength of the financial accelerator, which is driven by the col-
lateral constraint described in the model, does not change with these shocks.4 In 
turn, the rental market reform affects how the economy responds to the LTV shock, 
defined as loosening the credit constraint. Our interpretation is as follows. The ini-
tial shock, i.e., credit loosening, is positively affecting the demand for mortgages 
as borrowers can now afford to acquire more housing services with credit. A well-
functioning and affordable rental sector provides a viable alternative to satisfy these 
needs, hence limiting the demand for mortgages and softening the financial acceler-
ator effect. During the expansionary phase on the housing market, affordable rental 
opportunities would then tame demand pressures and thus limit price increases. 
Equivalently, lower indebtedness of households means that price corrections dur-
ing downturns are less severe. As a result, one would expect more stable housing 
markets after the reform. Since housing markets and the macroeconomy are linked 
through the collateral constraint, this will also bring higher macroeconomic stability. 
As shown in Table 7, this is exactly the case. After the reform, the volatility of house 
prices attributed to LTV shocks declines from 0.71 to 0.55 . This, in turn, leads 
to higher macroeconomic stability as evidenced by an almost 30% decline in the 
standard deviation of both GDP and inflation attributed to the LTV shock. Overall, 
a reform in the housing market that enhances the share of the rental market brings 
more stability to the economy in the aftermath of financial shocks, but not monetary 
or productivity shocks.
Table 7  The effects of rental market reforms on macroeconomic volatility
The figures present the standard deviation of a given variable that can be attributed to a given shock
IR shock Technology shock LTV shock
Benchmark Reform Benchmark Reform Benchmark Reform
GDP 1.5722 1.5505 1.8121 1.8071 1.0934 0.7935
Inflation 0.8037 0.7902 0.3655 0.3751 0.4310 0.3092
House prices 0.8427 0.8248 1.9734 2.0049 0.7124 0.5548
4 This is consistent with the findings in Rubio (2014b). Impulse responses show little aggregate differ-
ences with respect to the rental market share. However, the policy trade-offs in the presence of supply 
shocks are improved when the rental market share increases.
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6  Conclusions and policy recommendations
The share of the rental housing market in many countries around the globe is 
small. In this paper, we have conducted a micro–macroanalysis to understand bet-
ter the causes and effects of this phenomenon, as well as to provide some pol-
icy recommendations. For the micro evidence, we have focused on the study of 
Rubaszek and Czerniak (2017), which is based on a survey conducted in Poland, 
a country characterized by a very low share of the private rental market. The 
authors show that the rental market is treated as a short-term, temporary solu-
tion, and not as a vital alternative to ownership for a longer stay. The results of 
the survey indicate that the preferences of households are strongly skewed toward 
owning due to both economic and psychological factors. Households perceive 
ownership not only as a cheaper form of satisfying housing needs, but also as 
the only way to provide a safe place for the family and to really “feel at home.” 
The survey also suggests that inefficient institutions and the lack of professional 
renting services are among the most important barriers to the development of the 
private rental market. As regards macro evidence, with a panel of data for 28 EU 
countries and the period 2004–2017 we show that the underdevelopment of the 
private rental market amplifies the elasticity of house price with respect to key 
macroeconomic fundamentals: output, interest rates, and to a lower-degree credit 
dynamics.
Given the above micro–macroevidence about the reasons and consequences of 
rental market underdevelopment, we have used a DSGE model with rental housing 
and collateral constraints, which we calibrated to the Polish data, to quantify the 
effects of three reforms: (i) equalizing fiscal incentives for different types of housing 
tenure, (ii) removing the “bad tenant effect” on the level of rents, and (iii) improv-
ing the standard of rental services leading to a shift in housing tenure preferences. 
All three reforms lead to an increase in the share of the rental market in the long 
run. Our computations indicate that introducing the three reforms would shift the 
rental share from 6.8 to 15.0%. We also show that reforming the rental market is 
also beneficial for macroeconomic stability. For LTV shocks, the financial accelera-
tor effects derived from loosening the collateral constraint are dampened after the 
reforms. Then, even though this financial shock promotes borrowing and consump-
tion, a well-functioning rental market mitigates its effects and brings stability to both 
the housing market and the macroeconomy.
The above results justify why in some countries making the rental market func-
tion effectively should be considered a top priority for housing policy. Based on the 
results of the study, we may formulate a number of recommendations for housing 
policy. First of all, lowering the relative cost of renting in comparison with own-
ing seems to be one of the key factors. A direct method would be to introduce 
rental subsidies, even if this kind of housing policy could have an impact on rental 
prices (Viren 2013). Lowering the relative cost of renting could also be achieved 
by introducing smart regulations, e.g., limiting the “bad tenant” risk. Eliminating 
fiscal measures promoting ownership would also help. Second, improving the qual-
ity of rental services would contribute to changing psychological attitudes toward 
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renting. This could be achieved by encouraging professional investors that special-
ize in managing and building rental housing, but also by supporting associations of 
individual landlords or rental management companies. Third, smart regulations that 
protect “good tenants” against the risk of large rent hikes or unexpected eviction 
would increase the sense of security and stability of the rent contract. This would 
reduce one of the most important barriers to demand for rental houses: the belief 
that renting is not a stable form of satisfying housing needs. Finally, it is worth men-
tioning that the decision about buying a dwelling is often based on a flawed eco-
nomic reasoning. This might lead to the conclusion that education or information 
campaigns about advantages and disadvantages of different forms of housing ten-
ure could contribute to the increase in demand for rental as well as better housing 
choices of households.
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Appendix. Fragments of the survey questionnaire
 Q1. Year of birth
 Q2. Sex
 Q3. Marital status
 Q4. Number of children
 Q6. Education
 Q7. Employment status
 Q8. Income (your economic situation on a scale of 1 to 10)
 Q9. Size of town
 Q10. Tenure status of currently inhabited residence
 Q11. In comparison with the current place of your residence you grew up in:
a. Different country
b. Different town
c. The same town
 Q12. Since when have you lived at your current address?
 M. Rubaszek, M. Rubio 
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 Q13. When do you expect to change your residence
 Q14. The most likely tenure status of new residence in case of moving
 Q15. A choice in case of no funds to buy a dwelling
 Q16. Ignoring other factors, please indicate if you prefer renting or buying with a 
mortgage:
 E1. The burden of paying mortgage installments vs. the cost of renting
 E2. Risk of house price vs. rent price fluctuations
 E3. Transaction costs
 E4. Taxes
 Q17. Ignoring other factors, please indicate if you prefer renting or buying with a 
mortgage:
 P1. Social status
 P2. Sense of freedom and independence
 P3. Comfort
 P4. Peace of mind
 P5. Well-being
 P6. Attachment to dwelling
 P7. Family
 P8. Happiness
 Q18. Please indicate which factors are decreasing the comfort of being a tenant?
a. Tenants are not well protected against rent increases
b. Tenants are too much constrained in decorating and modifying the apartment
c. Landlords are inspecting the apartment too often (invigilation in private life)
d. Tenants are not well protected against eviction
e. Rents are too high in comparison with mortgage installment
f. The offer of dwellings to rent is too scarce to meet preferences
 Q19. Please indicate which factors reduce the attractiveness of buy-to-let investment?
a. Excessive restrictions on rent increases
b. Lack of culture of tenants (e.g., devastation of rented dwellings)
c. Excessive protection of tenants against eviction, increasing the risk of busi-
ness
d. The expected rate of return is too low because of the low levels of rents
e. Low demand for renting, i.e., due to strong preferences towards ownership
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